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The National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) and its prime 
contractors currently use a software tool called RMAT (the Reliability and 
Maintainability Assessment Tool) for the forecasting of Orbital Replacement Unit 
(ORU) failure rates and associated maintenance demands for the International 
Space Station (ISS).   This thesis introduces a new model: CMAM (the 
Comparative Maintenance Analysis Tool), which was developed to replicate 
some of the basic functionality of RMAT in order to provide a comparative look at 
RMAT results.  The CMAM program, developed in Visual Basic.net and 
dynamically linked to a Microsoft ACCESS database, focuses on a 
representative set of critical Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs that represent key 
items that require both internal and external maintenance in both pressurized and 
un-pressurized storage) and generated failure rate data for each critical ORU.  
The results of the CMAM model are then compared with the failure rates 
generated by RMAT program for the same set of critical ORUs.  These two 
independently developed sets of data are then analyzed against historic failure 
rates for these ISS parts. 
The results of this analysis are used to conduct a sensitivity analysis of 
both the CMAM and RMAT programs in order to help identify the primary 
contributing factors behind divergence issues between forecasted failures and 
associated maintenance from actual (historical) failure rates. 
Recommendations are provided, based upon the results of the 
comparison, with respect to the sensitivity of RMAT to changes in certain input 
parameters, as well as on the feasibility of implementing CMAM as a 
comparative tool for use by both NASA and Boeing Logistics and Maintenance 
(L&M) personnel for the purpose of RMAT sensitivity analysis, as well as use in 
initial operational planning for optimizing ORU stocking levels while awaiting 
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The logistics and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) is a 
one of a kind system with over 5700 orbital replacement units (ORUs)1, and 
spare parts that number into the hundreds of thousands.  Parts for the ISS come 
from 127 major US vendors and 70 major international vendors.  It is the 
responsibility of the International Space Station Logistics and Maintenance (L&M) 
organization at Johnson Space Center in Houston Texas to integrate and test 
these spares before either delivery to the ISS or ground spare storage. 
The objective of the ISS L&M organization is to define, procure, deliver, 
and manage the resources required to support and maintain ISS systems and 
support equipment both on-orbit and on the ground during assembly and 
assembly complete operations of the ISS.   In order to meet this objective NASA 
ISS L&M must maintain a comprehensive ORU and spares database with up to 
date reliability data for use in predicting and evaluating on-orbit, and ground 
spares requirements.   
The primary tool used for this purpose is the Reliability and Maintainability 
Assessment Tool (RMAT).  RMAT is a simulation tool that generates ORU 
failures, quantifies corrective and preventative maintenance requirements, and 
quantifies ISS resources needed to restore the ISS to an operational state.  
RMAT is the ISS Program/GAO accepted2 tool for conducting maintenance 
prediction analysis and trade studies, and, when used in concert with an accurate 
and updated ORU database, as well as with other tools such as Steady State3 
spreadsheets, provides a robust set of forecast data.  However, RMAT is a 
                                            
1 Although the total number of ORUs is estimated at 5700 the ORU database (MADS) lists 
1379 unique ORU types available for reliability analysis. 
2 The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) is the investigative arm of Congress whose 
mission is to execute audits, surveys, investigations and evaluations of Government programs to 
support oversight and funding decisions 
3 ISS Steady State is defined as after Assembly Complete (AC) operations 
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complex program written in an obsolete programming language (FORTRAN77) 
that requires a high degree of user familiarity in order to produce meaningful 
results, and to summarize those results for decision-making purposes.  RMAT 
requires the preparation of multiple text-based input files that can be and often is, 
extremely time consuming.   Additionally, while recent analysis of actual versus 
predicted internal ORU failures shows a reasonable amount of correlation, 
external ORU failures show an increasing divergence between RMAT forecasted 
failures and actual failures. 
The ISS Comparative Maintenance Analysis Model (CMAM) was 
developed to replicate some of the basic functionality of RMAT in the areas of 
Corrective and Preventative ORU failure rate forecasts and required crew 
maintenance time requirements in order to: 
-Gain an understanding of the underlying algorithms used by RMAT for 
failure rate generation 
-Provide a user friendly Graphical User Interface (GUI) based program 
that allows for the generation of a basic set of comparative results against the 
more complex and comprehensive RMAT forecasts 
-Conduct a sensitivity analysis on both CMAM and RMAT results in order 
to identify why divergence issues have arisen between external failure rates and 
actual failure rates while internal failure rate forecasts remain relatively accurate. 
The CMAM program developed during this thesis study is a Visual 
Basic.Net (VB.net) based program that allows for the concurrent editing of an 
Access based ORU database, the querying of the ORU database for analysis of 
specific sets of ORUs, and the subsequent generation of corrective maintenance 
(CM) and preventative maintenance (PM) failure rate data for that set of ORUs. 
To analyze the inherent uncertainties of CMAM results, a representative 
set of ORUs was chosen from the comprehensive ORU database (MADS)4.  The 
                                            
4 MADS or the Modeling Analysis Data Set is the comprehensive ORU data set with 
associated ORU reliability data.  It is the primary responsibility of NASA R&M to update MADS 
and it is used extensively by NASA and Boeing L&M teams for reliability analysis. 
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representative set of ORUs consists of 60 internal, and 60 external ORUs with 
the highest criticality code (C1)5, and heaviest by weight to orbit6.   This set of 
ORUs was assumed to have the same generic failure distribution characteristics 
as the entire set of ISS ORUs.   
Comparison of CMAM and RMAT results in terms of these 120 ORUs 
shows a 7.5% discrepancy in failure rates when looked at over the life of the ISS.  
Additionally, external ORU failure rate predictions of the two programs are within 
2%, internal failure rate forecasts show an approximate 8% difference (CMAM 
and RMAT show a relatively close correlation when overall failure rates are 
compared.   
The CMAM program is most sensitive to changes in Preventative 
Maintenance timeframes for short MTBF (Mean Time Between Failure)7 ORUs 
when wear-out failures are modeled.  Since failure rates for wear-out failures 
using a Weibull distribution increase exponentially towards the end of life of an 
ORU it is imperative to conduct preventative maintenance of these parts in a 
timely manner.  If short MTBF ORUs are allowed to operate until failure (w/o 
preventative maintenance) these parts will produce very high failure rates in the 
forecast model.  Analysis of the 120 ORUs within the CMAM database reveals 
that the majority of planned PM is for internal ORUs while external parts are 
more often allowed to operate past predicted failure (based upon criticality of 
component).  Since RMAT uses a similar Weibull distribution algorithm and 
similar shape factors8, and if the critical ORU list used for CMAM results is 
considered to be “representative” of the entire ORU list used by RMAT – then it 
can be assumed that RMAT is also sensitive to Preventative maintenance 
                                            
5 Criticality Code 1 (C1) is defined as a single point failure that could result in loss of Space 
Station or loss of flight or ground personnel. 
6 Weight to orbit was an arbitrary choice for ORU set analysis, and was made early in this 
research due to ORU/spare up-mass to the ISS being such a critical factor at this time. 
7 MTBF for this thesis is defined as the average time (in hours) that a component works 
without failure. 
8 The Weibull distribution often used to model wear-out failures of components has three 
parameters: location, size and shape. 
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scheduling, especially for external ORUs.  This sensitivity, along with inherent 
uncertainty of ORU MTBF values may be enough to explain the divergence 
issues between external failure rates and actual failures.  The results of this 
sensitivity analysis are discussed in detail within this thesis.      
CMAM could potentially be used in concert with RMAT to provide a “first 
cut” forecast of ISS ORU failures and crew requirements to give L&M planners a 
general idea of what failures they can expect while waiting for the comprehensive 
RMAT results.  CMAM results can also be used as a sensitivity check of RMAT  
for random, and wear-out failure modes for predictions of required corrective and 
preventative maintenance actions.  These comparative results could lead to the 
rapid determination (and the corresponding correction) of future divergence 






I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
Assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) began in November 
1998 and will continue until completion sometime around 2010.  During assembly 
and over the ISS’s nominal 10 year lifetime it will serve as an orbital platform for 
the United States and International Partners to make advances in microgravity, 
space life, and earth sciences, as well as engineering research and technology 
development.  The utilization of the ISS for creating knowledge and technology is 
an enterprise that not only requires the initial construction of a safe and viable 
orbiting laboratory, but also requires the maintenance of this one-of-a-kind 
system on a continuous basis in order to optimize the functional availability of 
systems required for both experimentation, and crew life support. 
The ISS Logistics and Maintenance (L&M) Organization has the following 
philosophy: 
The ISS does not have any landing gear, is not a satellite exploring 
the solar system, it has no International borders, and it has no 
organizational lines.  It is one Station, that must be supported by 
ONE crew, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, three-
hundred and sixty-five days a year.9 
With this in mind the NASA and Boeing L&M teams rely upon developed, tested, 
and proven modeling programs in order to forecast Orbital Replacement Unit 
(ORU) failure data and associated maintenance requirements for use in 
operational planning and to determine if the ISS is logistically supportable in 
current and future configurations.  The primary tool for ORU predictive analysis is 
the RMAT program.  
This thesis report describes the RMAT program used by NASA and 
Boeing L&M, and introduces a new predictive tool (CMAM), developed as part of 
this research, which replicates some of the basic functions of RMAT.  The 
objective is to gain a better understanding of the RMAT program, and to develop 
                                            
9 NASA Logistics and Maintenance Overview Briefing, March 8, 2004 
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a user friendly tool for conducting quick ORU failure analysis and sensitivity 
analysis of various failure parameters.  These results can be used to determine 
what may be the root cause of divergence issues discovered between RMAT 
results and historical failures for external ISS ORUs.  
B. LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE ISS 
The ISS has over 5700 orbital replacement units (ORUs), and spare parts 
that number into the hundreds of thousands.  Parts for the ISS come from 127 
major US vendors and 70 major international vendors and in most cased require 
the shipment of these parts from the prime vender (often called the Original 
Equipment Manufacturer or OEM) location to Johnson Space Center (JSC) in 
Houston, TX for testing, and then to Kennedy Space Center (KSC), FL for follow 
on delivery to the ISS.  
The objective of the ISS L&M organization is to define, procure, deliver, 
and manage the resources required to support and maintain ISS systems and 
support equipment both on-orbit and on the ground.  The mission statement of 
the L&M team is two-part: 
Part I:  During Design and Development Phase to define necessary 
supportability requirements and to ensure they are planned for and met in order 
to economically, time effectively, and safely support successful operations.  
Part II: During Operations Phase to manage logistics resources and 
conduct maintenance operations that ensure that the on-orbit vehicle and its 
associated systems support safe, successful operations and utilization. 
The On-Orbit Ops and Maintenance Re-supply section within the NASA 
L&M organization is responsible for continuous monitoring of up-mass and crew 
time required for maintenance and on-orbit stowage of spares both inside and 
outside of the Station.  This section uses a specific tool (called the Reliability 
Maintainability Analysis Tool or RMAT) to help predict and evaluate all on-orbit 
maintenance.  ISS L&M management found that initial outputs of the RMAT 
predictive model during the assembly phase (specifically from flights 2A through 
12A) show that these flights, and the continued ISS operations and assembly 
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have limited failure tolerance and redundancy especially in the power and 
thermal systems areas.  The main goal of the On-Orbit Maintenance Re-supply 
team is not simply to buy more spares but to maximize/optimize the ability to re-
supply spares quickly when needed and to store the most critical ORUs onboard 
in the proper quantity during the assembly stages. 
The ISS Program office has the overall responsibility for oversight of the 
three main ISS contractors:  Boeing, the United Space Alliance (USA), and the 
Blackhawk Corporation.  Boeing Logistics and Maintenance, headquartered in 
Houston, TX is responsible for the production of the On-Orbit Logistics and 
Supportability Assessment Report (LSAR).  The On-Orbit LSAR is a bi-annual 
report that uses historical data, and predictive analysis (primarily through the use 
of RMAT) to make assessments of the ongoing logistic supportability of the ISS.  
C. LOGISTICS SUPPORTABILITY ASSESSMENT  
The overall goal of the ISS L&M system is to support the Station within the 
programs limited resources, to provide a safe and habitable environment for the 
crew, and to minimize ISS system downtime (downtime that impacts the function 
of the ISS as a research facility).  To accomplish this goal the L&M personnel 
provide periodic assessments to determine the resource requirements needed to 
logistically support the ISS as designed and built.  These requirements are 
summarized in the On–Orbit Logistics Supportability Assessment Report (LSAR). 
The resources for maintenance of the ISS taken into account within the LSAR 
include:10 
• Spares and spare parts (ORUs, and other spares) 
• Launch locations for storage of spares 
• Tools for performing required maintenance 
• Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) 
• Extra-Vehicular Robotic capability (EVR) 
• Transportation assets for transport of supplies to the ISS 
In order to understand the LSAR it is important to understand the two 
basic ISS maintenance types, and the ISS 3-Level Maintenance Concept.    
                                            
10 This list only covers major resource items and is not all -inclusive. 
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Maintenance for the ISS will be either Corrective Maintenance (CM), or 
Preventative Maintenance (PM).  Corrective Maintenance is maintenance 
performed to repair or replace ORUs/spare parts that fail while in service.  
Preventative maintenance is maintenance performed to replace ORUs/spare 
parts that have a specified operational life (in accordance with reliability data), 
and have not failed yet but have reached the end of their operational effective 
life. 
Within the ISS 3-Level Maintenance Concept there are three levels of 
maintenance: Organizational, Intermediate, and Depot maintenance.   
Organizational Maintenance is either corrective maintenance by on-orbit 
replaceable unit removal and replacement, or in situ repair, or preventative 
through scheduled change out of items, service or inspection in order to maintain 
system function in an operational condition and to prevent degradation of ISS 
performance. Organizational repair can occur either on-orbit or on the ground. 
Intermediate Maintenance is corrective maintenance only to repair ORUs 
by disassembly, repair and reassembly, and is in response to real-time 
requirements for a work-around solution.  This type of maintenance is on-orbit 
and internal to the ISS only.   
Depot maintenance is corrective maintenance to repair/overhaul a 
designated hardware item that cannot be accomplished at the other maintenance 
levels (this requires broken ORUs/spare parts to be returned to earth and fixed at 
either one of the 4 NASA depots, or back at the OEM facility).  
Thus it can be stated that there are only two levels of on-orbit 
maintenance – Organizational which consists of removal and replacement of 
ORUs, in situ repair, servicing and manual fault isolation, and is conducted either 
within the ISS (IVA), thru external spacewalk (EVA), or through external robotics 
(EVR), and Intermediate which consists of removal and replacement of ORUs at 
a maintenance work area through the application of authorized repair kits, and is 
conducted IVA only.   
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The major logistics resources available to support the ISS include: ORUs/ 
spare parts, locations for storage of spares, tools for performing required 
maintenance, Intra-Vehicular Activity (IVA), Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA), Extra-
Vehicular Robotic capability (EVR), and transportation assets for transport of 
supplies to the ISS. 
It is important to note that, for the purposes of the ISS On-Orbit LSAR and 
predictive analysis, the ISS post assembly complete re-supply/logistics support is 
still based upon four (4) shuttle flights per year (3 defined as mixed mission 
(pressurized/un-pressurized), and 1 completely un-pressurized).  These four 
flights are also planned for the assembly phase.  The assembly phase requires a 
large amount of new hardware (for assembly of the ISS) and thus much less 
capability for ORUs/spares upmass.  Therefore, it is expected that a supply 
backlog will build up during the later stages of the assembly phase, and will take 
some time to work-off upon Assembly Complete.  This backlog consists of 
maintenance and repair actions needed to restore the optimal functionality and 
redundancy of ISS systems (to date the backlogs have consisted primarily of 
non-critical ORUs since ISS on-orbit maintenance is scheduled based upon the 
priority (criticality) of the task).  ORU backlog is another critical element in the 
predictive analysis process. 
The overall goal of the L&M effort is to maximize the availability of key 
functions of the ISS while maintaining a safe environment for the crew.  Boeing 
L&M and NASA utilize a tool called the Station Availability Reporting Tool 
(START) to provide a snapshot, and running cumulative tally (monthly) of Station 
hardware and functional availability.  The 10 key functions looked at for this 
availability report include: 
• Provide usage power 
• Provide CO2 removal 
• Provide Intra-module Temperature and Humidity Control (THC)  
• Provide Internal Thermal Control System (ITCS) Heat Transfer 
• Provide Command & Telemetry (uplink/downlink) 
• Provide Robotics capability 
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• Provide Payload Data Downlink 
• Provide Command and control 
• Provide Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) capability 
• Provide Fire Detection/ Suppression 
These functions are reported in four separate ways: 
• Predicted availability (shows a prediction of CURRENT availability 
of the function based on current sparing levels) 
• Performance since activation of the function (measured) 
• Performance for the last 6 months (measured) 
• Availability Objective (estimated goals primarily for the performance 
since activation) 
The supportability assessment addresses any shortcomings listed on the 
functional availability reports, and also assesses whether future functional 
objectives will be attainable, based primarily on predictive analysis.  The primary 
predictive analysis tool used in developing the LSAR is the Loral Reliability and 
Maintainability Assessment Tool (RMAT). 
D. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS USING RMAT 
The Reliability and Maintenance Assessment Tool (RMAT) is a Monte 
Carlo Based simulation tool used to project maintenance demands, including 
maintenance performed and resultant backlog.  The main constraints of the 
RMAT program for simulation include (but are not limited to): 
• Available spares 
• Robotic capability 
• Available weight/volume to orbit (primarily during assembly stage) 
RMAT also has a number of input parameters that need to be 
entered in order to make predictions.  There are 19 parameters that can 
be altered to affect predictions.  However, the primary parameters include: 
• Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) –to predict # of corrective 
actions needed per ORU 
• Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) to predict # of crew hours needed 
(both CM/PM actions) 
• Life Limit of ORU 
• Number of crew members required to perform maintenance task 
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• Quantities (of spares on orbit) 
• Reliability class (criticality) 
• Duty cycle 
• Frequency of Preventative Maintenance 
RMAT takes these constraints and input parameters and utilizes Monte 
Carlo processes/mathematical algorithms to predict ORU failures, predict 
corrective/preventative maintenance requirements, predict size and impact of 
maintenance backlog, and predict ISS resources needed to keep the ISS in an 
operational state.   
RMAT uses iterative Monte Carlo simulation (primarily to account for 
inherent uncertainties within ORU predicted MTBF and K-factor11 values), and 
mathematical algorithms (primarily for failure distribution calculations) for 
maintenance demand forecasting. An RMAT run consists of 600 iterations of a 
specific set of constraints/input parameters placed into the simulation model for a 
specific timeframe. The maintenance demand/result is an average of the 
iterations.  RMAT generates failures of three basic types:   
• Infant Mortality failures: failures that occur at a higher rate early in 
the lifetime of the hardware.   
• Random failures:  failures that occur randomly throughout the life of 
the ISS. 
• Wear-out/life limited failures:  Failures occurring at a higher rate as 
they approach end of life.  
RMAT uses the following distributions when modeling these three types of 
failures: 
• Exponential distribution:  Random Failures 
• Weibull distribution:  Infant Mortality and Wear-Out failures   
These three failure types and their respective distributions leads to an 
overall ORU life cycle curve that resembles what is called the “bathtub” curve: 
                                            
11 K-factor is a multiplier that accounts for increased equipment maintenance actions not 
included in the inherent MTBF estimates.  See section III.C for further details.   
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Figure 1.   ORU life-cycle failures versus time (from:  Beardmore) 
There are four primary outputs of the RMAT program:  
• Predicted maintenance actions required by flight (these 
maintenance actions are EVA/IVA/EVR actions required in 
response to a failure or a scheduled preventative maintenance 
remove and replace (PMRR), or from required servicing/inspection 
activity) 
• Maintenance Action Backlog (the backlog is made up of ORUs 
awaiting maintenance action due to a shortfall in resources (on-
orbit spares/ Shuttle up-mass/shuttle flights),  
• Predicted crew time for maintenance actions by flight.  (This 
includes EVA/IVA/EVR man-hours consumed to conduct 
maintenance activities) 
• Predicted Up-Mass requirements by flight (this includes total ORU 
spares weight that will be launched to conduct corrective or 
scheduled maintenance). 
E. OVERALL RESULTS FROM RMAT 
Simulation results for the internal maintenance (IVA) of the ISS show 
adequate support both during and post assembly.  RMAT results show a slightly 
negative margin between the number of maintenance actions required and the 
number of maintenance actions that will be performed leading to a minimal 
backlog buildup for IVA maintenance actions during the assembly stage.  Since 
RMAT conducts maintenance based on ORU priority, none of the ORU items 
within the backlog are high criticality (C1) items.    RMAT also shows a highly 
9 
positive margin upon assembly complete leading to the rapid work-off of this 
backlog.  This positive margin during post-assembly is due to the fact that more 
up-mass and crew time can be allocated for spares and maintenance (as 
opposed to assembly).  
External maintenance (EVA/EVR) does not seem to be as well supported.  
RMAT results show negative margins between maintenance required and 
maintenance performed both during assembly and post assembly complete.  
This will lead to a continual increase in EVA/EVR maintenance action backlog.  
Specifically, RMAT predicts that the ISS will require an average of 70 external 
maintenance actions per year during post assembly stage.  Of these 70 an 
average of 31.5 will be performed (based on available up-mass and EVA/EVR 
crew times).  
While RMAT seems to be predicting internal maintenance actions 
relatively accurately, there is a growing divergence between RMAT external 
maintenance predictions and actual/historical failures gathered to date.  When 
comparing RMAT predicted results to historical actuals (for both IVA and EVA 
respectively) the following results were seen: 
IVA: Cumulative IVA forecasted Corrective Maintenance (CM) crew times 
exceeded actuals by 3%, while actual Preventative Maintenance (PM) crew times 
exceed forecasts by approximately 11%.  Total CM / PM actions turned out to be 
within 15% of reported actuals. 
EVA: Cumulative EVA forecasted CM crew times exceeded actuals by 
over 95%, while forecasted PM crew times exceeded actuals by 100% (no actual 
PM external activities were recorded).  Average CM/PM EVA actions per year 
were forecasted to be nearly 44 and 12 respectively, while only 5 EVA CM 
actions were performed in total. 
NASA and Boeing L&M are currently examining these divergence issues 
by reviewing reliability data and RMAT model input fields in order to determine 
the most sensitive aspects of the model itself and to estimate the effects of 
variance resulting from inconsistencies between model and on-orbit maintenance 
10 
assumptions.  This thesis attempts to assist in this activity by developing an 
independent reliability model that replicates some of the basic functionality of 
RMAT and can be used comparatively to determine what input parameters have 
the greatest effect on model outputs. 
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II. CMAM DEVELOPMENT 
A. OVERVIEW 
The ISS Comparative Maintenance Model (CMAM) is a Visual Basic.Net ® 
program which calculates both corrective maintenance (CM) and preventative 
maintenance (PM) action requirements for ISS Orbital Replacement Units 
(ORUs) and associated crew maintenance time requirements (IVA/EVA/ EVR)12.  
CMAM was developed in order to replicate some of the functionality of RMAT in 
order to gain a better understanding of the algorithms used by RMAT, and to 
provide a basis for assessing the sensitivity of the two programs to changes in 
similar input parameters.  Additionally, CMAM is meant as a user-friendly option 
to the much more complex RMAT program for the understanding of general ORU 
failure rate data.  The process followed for CMAM development required the 
development of a separate ORU database constructed in Microsoft Access ® 
(see Appendix A) which was populated with a representative set13 of ORUs from 
the entire NASA/BOEING L&M ORU Modeling Analysis Data Set (MADS).   
Upon completion of the CMAM program, output data was gathered from both 
CMAM and RMAT (based upon similar input parameters) and the results 
compared.  Once the two output sets were compared, a sensitivity analysis was 
conducted on CMAM by altering the assumed failure rate distributions and 
associated input parameters to determine the effects on output values.  
Additionally, a Monte Carlo process Simulation package Crystal Ball ® was used 
to quantify the uncertainties inherent within CMAM results.  Finally, based upon 
the similarities between the RMAT and CMAM programs for calculating a narrow 




                                            
12 IVA is Intra-vehicle activity, EVA is Extra Vehicular Activity or “SpaceWalk”, and EVR is 
Extra-Vehicular Robotics. 
13 60 Internal and 60 External C1 ORUs (120 total) where chosen from the MADS list that 
were thought to display the same failure rate trends as the entire ORU set.  
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B. CMAM 
1. Basic Functionality 
CMAM allows for the calculation of both Corrective Maintenance and 
Preventative Maintenance Actions as well as the associated required crew 
maintenance time (in the areas of IVA/EVA/EVR) for a single ORU or a specified 
set of ORUs.  The following figure is a flowchart functionality diagram of CMAM: 










Figure 2.   CMAM Functionality Diagram 
CMAM calculates ORU failure rates utilizing both random failures and 
wear-out failures for each ORU. However, CMAM does not model/calculate infant 
mortality failures at this time.  It should be noted that while RMAT has the 
capability of modeling infant mortality events and “bad apple” failures it can, and 
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often is turned off.14  Unlike RMAT, the CMAM program does not take into 
account a spares list and available crew time – thus it does not calculate any 
type of backlog (CM/PM maintenance action or crew time backlogs).  The 
following is a diagram that shows the overall functionality of the RMAT program 
for comparison with CMAM: 
                                            
14 Early failure modeling options within RMAT include:  Fisher Price, Bad Apple, and No 
Early failure options.  No early failure option is often used due to ORU burn-in process conducted 
by part manufacturers. 
14 
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Figure 3.   RMAT Functionality Diagram (from:  The Boeing Company) 
Lastly, CMAM is dynamically linked to a Microsoft Access ® based ORU 
database which not only allows for the updating of the database from the CMAM 
GUI user interface, but also allows for the real time querying of the database for 
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specific sets of ORUs for failure rate calculation.  CMAM is designed with an 
easy-to-use query form that has the following built-in database query types:  
ORU Search By: 
• Assembly Flight 
• ISS Operational Year (Decimal Dated year) 
• ISS Subsystem 
• ORU name 
• Internal or External Component 
• Entire ORU Database  
2. Database Connectivity 
The CMAM ORU database consists of three tables: an ORU master parts 
list, an ISS Flight table, and an ISS Subsystem table.  The ORU master parts list 
and the ISS Flight table can be updated or modified from the CMAM user 
interface.        
The current CMAM database is populated with a “representative” set of 
ORUs for comparison against RMAT and to allow for the assumption that the 
primary sensitivities of this representative set will also be the primary sensitivities 
of the ORU database as a whole.   For the purposes of this thesis it was time 
prohibitive to enter the entire MADS ORU database into the CMAM ACCESS ® 
database. The MADS DB consists of approximately 1380 separate (unique) 
ORUs with 59 separate fields for each ORU.  The CMAM database uses only 26 
of these 59 fields.  Entry of all 1380 ORUs using the CMAM ORU update mask is 
estimated to take between 1.5 and 2 minutes per ORU or between 34.5 and 46 
hours for the entire ORU database.   
The CMAM representative ORU set comprises approximately 8.7% of the 
MADS database (120 ORUs) and is comprised of the highest criticality 
components sorted by weight and volume (i.e. the top 60 Criticality Code 1 ORUs 
with the highest volume and weight requirements to orbit where chosen from 




3. CMAM Distributions 
a. Overview 
A user considers a system reliable if it is available and operational 
when needed.   From an engineering standpoint, reliability is the ability of a 
system or unit to perform a required function under an assumed or stated set of 
conditions, for a specified period of time.  Quantifying reliability is achieved from 
the concept of reliability as a probability distribution.  The probability of a 
component surviving to a time t is the reliability R(t), and is expressed as: 
R(t) = # surviving at instant t / # at time =0 
A component failure can be classified into two groups: 1.) 
Degradation failures, where an important subcomponent drifts so far from original 
tolerance values that the component no longer functions, or 2.) Catastrophic 
failures, where the component reaches end of life.  The failure rate can be 
expresses as: 
f(t) = # failing per unit time at instant t / # surviving at instant t 
The failure rate can therefore be defined as the probability of failure in unit time 
of a component that is still working satisfactorily.   
  CMAM assumed two types of failure rates for ORUs:  a constant 
failure rate (to model the random failures that occur during the intrinsic life of the 
component), and an exponentially increasing failure rate (to model the wear-out 
failures that occur towards end of life or towards the end of the intrinsic life of the 
component).  The CMAM program mimics RMAT by using the exponential 
distribution to model constant rate failures, and the Weibull distribution for 
modeling the increasing failure rate wear-out failures.     
 b. The Exponential Distribution 
The exponential distribution is a relatively common distribution in 
reliability engineering that models the behavior of components that have a 
constant failure rate and results in the component having a reliability that 
17 
exponentially decreases through time.  The following equations show the 
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Figure 4.   Exponential Distribution Equations (from: Walpole) 
 
It is important to note that the two-parameter exponential distribution is utilized 
and coded into CMAM.  Since ORUs become activated at different times (flight 
decimal dates) CMAM is NOT a steady state calculation program. 
 c. The Weibull Distribution 
The Weibull distribution is a general purpose distribution used to 
model material strength, times-to-failure of electronic and mechanical 
components, equipment or systems.  The most general (3-parameter) case of the 
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Figure 5.   Weibull Distribution Equations (from:  Walpole)15 
The Weibull failure rate is a function of time, however, if the Weibull 
shape factor (β) is equal to 1 the Weibull distribution displays a constant failure 
rate and is in every characteristic identical to the exponential distribution.  In fact, 
shifting the Weibull shape factor (β) gives indication on all of the prevalent 
failures modes: 
                                            
15 MTBMAtotal (Mean Time Between Maintenance Actions-total) is the adjustment to MTBF 
values based upon the WP-4 Rutherford equation.  See Section 2.4.a 
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• β < 1 indicates infant mortality (poor production or insufficient burn in) 
• β = 1 indicates random failures  
• β = 1 to 4 indicates early wear out, early fatigue 
• β > 4 indicates old age or rapid wear-out at end of life 
CMAM allows the user to input the desired β value and is meant to be used to 
model wear-out failures – thus it is defaulted to 5 (similar to the RMAT program). 
It is important to note that the Weibull scale parameter (γ), which is 
imperative in determining the Weibull failure rate, is based on the Gamma 
Function.  The gamma function computation will be discussed in the next section 
(CMAM Algorithms).    
The following examples show the Weibull failure rates and 
cumulative probability of a component surviving (reliability) over time for both a 
long and short MTBF ORU with a beta value of 1: 
Chart 1: Weibull distribution (Beta =1) of failure 
















Chart 2: Weibull distribution (Beta = 1) of probability 























Chart 4: Weibull Distribution (Beta = 1) Probability of 












































Figure 6.   Weibull Distribution Example, Beta = 1 
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When Weibull shape  factor (β) = 1 the failure rate remains constant, and 
the reliability of the component exponentially decreases with time.  In the graphs 
above it is important to note how quickly the short MTBMA ORU (Breathing 
Apparatus Assembly) reliability decreases to approximately zero over the life of 
the ISS16 (Chart 4), while the long MTBMA ORU (DC/DC Converter) still has 
fairly high reliability over the same timeframe.   
The following examples show the Weibull failure rates and 
cumulative probability of a component failing (inverse reliability) over time for 
both a long and short MTBF ORU with a beta value of 5: 
Chart 1: Weibull distribution (Beta =5) of failure 
















Chart 2: Weibull distribution (Beta = 5) of probability 























Chart 4: Weibull Distribution (Beta = 5) Probability of 










































Figure 7.   Weibull Distribution Example, Beta = 5 
                                            
16 Life of ISS for this thesis study includes assembly and post assembly time and is 
approximated at 26 years.  
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With a Weibull shape parameter (β=5) it is important to note that although 
the failure rates increase exponentially in a similar fashion, the scaling of those 
failure rates is radically different for short as opposed to long MTBMA ORUs 
(charts 1 and 3).   
4. CMAM Algorithms 
 a. The Rutherford Equation 
Each assembly, subassembly, or component within the ISS has its 
own inherent reliability, often expressed as a Mean Time Between Failure 
(MTBF).  Often, MTBF by itself (without any modification) is used as the basis for 
determining failure rates.  This practice can and often does lead to unacceptable 
inaccuracies in actual (and forecasted) failure rates due to two factors:  usage, 
and the nature of reliability data itself.   
MTBF is by definition an average value of failure times based upon 
a universal population of like devices/components.17  MTBF therefore does not 
take into account duty cycles (component hot versus cold usage rates), human 
error when performing corrective maintenance (K-factor), or other life limiting 
factors (LifeLim).  Due to these issues, the following equations, were developed 
by L&M personnel and serve as the basis for all MTBF corrections within CMAM 
for corrective maintenance actions and are summarized as the WP-4 Rutherford 
equations: 
                                            
17 Taken from the 15 April 1991 Application of K-factor to Life estimates in External 
Maintenance Solution Team (EMST) Steady State Algorithm paper.  
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Figure 8.   Rutherford Equations (from: McDonnell Douglas Space 
Systems) 
Once again it is important to note that Preventative Maintenance 
(PM) calculations are not a function of MTBMAtotal, and rely upon stated/ 
unmodified Mean Time Between Preventative Maintenance Remove and 
Replace (MTBPMRR) times only.   
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b. The Gamma Function 
As discussed earlier, the scale parameter (γ) of the Weibull 
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Figure 9.   Gamma Function (from: Walpole) 
 The recursion formula has no algebraic solution thus, in order to 
code the Weibull distribution into CMAM an estimate for the solution of the 
Gamma function had to be used.  An estimate of the solution to the Gamma 
function can be attained through the use of Stirling’s Asymptotic Series.  Stirling’s 
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Figure 10.   Stirling’s Asymptotic Series (from: Beyer) 
 This asymptotic series in the form above is a series expansion of 
the gamma function accurate to 4 decimal places, which provides reasonable 
accuracy in failure rate calculation for the purposes of CMAM development. 
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5. CMAM Output 
The CMAM output report is in the form of four separate text files that show 
the following: 
• File 1:  Maintenance Actions per year  
• File 2:  IVA crew time requirements per year 
• File 3: EVA crew time requirements per year 
• File 4:  EVR (Robotic) crew time requirements per year 
Each of the files is listed per ORU (each line in the report is a separate 
ORU) with calculations listed by year (the year is listed with the calculation 
immediately to the right of the year)18.  Each of the files also has a summary 
portion that lists both Overall (TOTAL) and Average per year calculations (similar 
to RMAT calculation results).  However, CMAM calculates both CM and PM 
actions and summarized them in one column (unlike RMAT which has a separate 
queue (queue 1) for PM calculations).  Figure 11 is an example of the CMAM 
output screen:  
                                            
18 The Year is defined as the Operational year of the ISS with time = 0 defined as the 
decimal date of the first assembly flight (AF-01A) which occurred on 20 November 1998. 
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III. RMAT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 A. RMAT VERSUS CMAM OUTPUT COMPARISON 
An attempt was made to directly compare the output of RMAT and CMAM 
based upon an identical set of input ORUs (the CMAM top 120 critical ORU set), 
and a similar set of input parameters.  The following input parameters where 
normalized for RMAT/CMAM output comparison: 
• Duration of failure rate calculations: 26 years/result format by year 
• Random and Wear-out failures calculated 
• ORU Beta value set to default value of 5 
• Corrective and Preventative Maintenance calculated per ORU 
Since RMAT calculations take into consideration spare ORU availability 
and crew time availability, an infinite spares list and infinite crew time had to be 
assumed within RMAT (unconstrained spares and crew time run).  Additionally, 
the bad apple and infant mortality functions of RMAT were turned off for the 
comparison run.  The following table is a summary of the RMAT preprocessor 
input parameters: 
 
Table 1.   RMAT Input parameters 
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Upon execution of RMAT failure rate calculations it was determined that, 
over a 26 year period a total of 3069.83 corrective and preventative maintenance 
actions were forecasted with an average of 118.07 actions per year.  Below 
summarizes the RMAT output results: 
 RMAT Version 5.9.1        DATE: 07-15-2004     TIME: 18:40:51
     USER NAME: Brian T. Soldon                                             
     DATA DESCRIPTION: Top120 ORU output for CMAM comparison                       
    <<<<< MAINTENANCE ACTION SECTION >>>>>        
            MAINTENANCE  PERFORMED                
  TIME      FLIGHT    EVA only EVR only Co-op Tot EVA Tot EVR Tot IVA
                    
2.01
4.02
 3.000                           0.02          0.00        0.09           0.11         0.09      74.14
 4.000                           0.02          0.00        0.05           0.07         0.05      105.04
 5.000                           0.20          0.00        0.13           0.33         0.13      104.39
 6.000                           0.95          0.00        1.42           2.37         1.42      112.61
 7.000                           0.27          0.00        0.45           0.72         0.45      120.94
 8.000                           0.61          0.00        1.92           2.53         1.92     127.43
 9.000                           0.47          0.00        0.69           1.16         0.69      120.74
10.000                          1.45          0.00        1.80           3.25         1.80      131.84
11.000                          1.40          0.00         2.27          3.66         2.27      129.61
12.000                          0.23          0.00         1.22          1.45         1.22      121.14
13.000                          0.90          0.00         1.31          2.20         1.31      133.99
14.000                          0.65          0.00         0.79          1.44         0.79     131.18
15.000                          0.78          0.00         0.82          1.60         0.82     136.37
128.33
17.000                          0.81          0.00         1.66          2.48         1.66      133.08
18.000                          0.89          0.00         1.51          2.39         1.51      131.67
19.000                          0.90          0.00         1.37          2.27         1.37      133.3
21.000                          0.81          0.00         1.27          2.09         1.27      132.83
22.000                          0.84          0.00         1.33          2.17         1.33     130.82
23.000                          0.78          0.00         1.15          1.93         1.15      132.54
24.000                          0.97          0.00          1.51         2.49         1.51      150.11
25.000                          0.81          0.00          1.16         1.97         1.16      132.68
26.000                          0.89          0.00          1.30         2.19         1.30      132.78
TOTAL                          17.3          0.00          27.6         45.0         27.6      3024.83






























16.000                          0.87          0.00         1.06          1.94         1.06      
20.000                          0.83          0.00         1.33          2.16         1.33           131.22
1.000                            0.00          0.00        0.00           0.00         0.00
2.000                            0.00          0.00        0.00           0.00         0.00
 
Table 2.   RMAT Maintenance Action output results 
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Upon execution of CMAM failure rate calculations, it was found that RMAT 
was forecasting slightly higher failure rates than CMAM for overall failures and 
averages of required failures per year.  CMAM estimated 92.5% of the total CM 
and PM failures estimated by RMAT19.  However it was also determined that  
CMAM output results are highly sensitive to changes in preventative 
maintenance remove-and-replace (PMRR) scheduling, especially when 
calculating failures on short MTBF (MTBMAtotal)20 ORUs over long periods of 
time (i.e. duration of forecast calculations ≥ 20 years).  This modeling sensitivity 
was exemplified through changing the preventative maintenance schedule of just 
1 ORU within the CMAM database.  A CMAM run was executed both with and 
without preventative maintenance on an external component:  Control Moment 
Gyro (CMG).  The two runs resulted in nearly a 50% difference in total 
maintenance actions required over the 26 year period (all attributed to increases 
in corrective maintenance requirements on the CMG).  The following tables show 
the results of the CMAM run with and without CMG preventative maintenance: 
                                            
19 RMAT forecasted failures = 3069.83, CMAM forecasted failures = 2840.14  (CMAM 
failures / RMAT failures = 92.5%) 
20 MTBMAtotal is the adjustment to MTBF values based upon the WP-4 Rutherford Equation 
discussed in Section 2.4.a. 
30 
CMAM Version 3        DATE: 08-15-2004   CMAM Version 3        DATE: 08-15-2004   
     USER NAME: Brian T. Soldon                                  USER NAME: Brian T. Soldon                               
     DATA DESCRIPTION: Top120 ORU output                DATA DESCRIPTION: Top120 ORU output              
With Preventative Maintenance on CMG (external) Without Preventasive Maintenance on CMG (external)
Time EVA IVA Time EVA IVA
1 0.208 9.0323 1 0.208 9.0323
2 0.208 9.3975 2 0.208 9.3975
3 1.0838 67.9256 3 0.4593 67.9256
4 1.8385 100.7378 4 1.0471 100.7378
5 1.8385 100.7474 5 1.0896 100.7474
6 1.8385 100.7698 6 1.2129 100.7698
7 2.0077 100.6449 7 1.6537 100.6449
8 2.0077 106.4453 8 2.161 106.4453
9 2.0077 107.6574 9 3.0124 107.6574
10 2.0077 107.8614 10 4.3365 107.8614
11 2.0077 108.1665 11 6.2824 108.1665
12 2.0077 108.6041 12 9.0197 108.6041
13 2.0077 109.2142 13 12.7387 109.2142
14 2.0077 110.0387 14 17.6499 110.0387
15 2.0077 111.1268 15 23.9844 111.1268
16 2.0077 112.5334 16 31.9938 112.5334
17 2.0077 114.3163 17 41.9501 114.3163
18 2.0077 116.5421 18 54.146 116.5421
19 2.0077 119.2811 19 68.8944 119.2811
20 2.0077 122.6077 20 86.5288 122.6077
21 2.0077 126.6026 21 107.4033 126.6026
22 2.0077 131.354 22 131.8924 131.354
23 2.0077 136.9525 23 160.391 136.9525
24 2.0077 143.4966 24 193.3146 143.4966
25 2.0077 151.0862 25 231.0992 151.0862
26 2.0077 159.8309 26 274.2011 159.8309
TOTAL 47.1693 2792.973 TOTAL 1466.878 2792.973
AVE/yr 1.814204 107.422 AVE/yr 56.4184 107.422





























































Table 3.   CMAM Maintenance Action Output results 
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CMG With and Without Preventative Maintenance






























Table 4.   CMAM CMG Maintenance Action forecasts w/ and w/o PM 
The sensitivity of CMAM to changes in preventative maintenance 
scheduling, especially on short MTBF (MTBMAtotal) ORUs when calculating 
failures over long period of time, can be attributed to characteristics of the 
Weibull distribution when calculating wear-out failures.   As discussed earlier, 
when the Weibull shape factor (β) is greater than four (β = 5 in our case) it results 
in exponentially increasing failure rates as components age (approach end-of-life 
or wear-out).  The goal is to schedule preventative maintenance on these 
32 
components prior to corrective maintenance requirements becoming 
unacceptably high.  However, if no preventative maintenance is scheduled, 
corrective maintenance forecasts on these components will continue to increase 
exponentially, and will result in high failure rate predictions (unrealistically high in 
most cases).  Thus, it can be said that if a β value of five is used in wear-out 
failure calculation, it is imperative to accurately schedule preventative 
maintenance on short MTBF (MTBMAtotal) ORUs.   
The current ORU reliability forecasting issue, as stated in LSAR revisions 
M, N, and O, is that: while Cumulative IVA actual versus forecasted PM and CM 
maintenance actions and crew times remain relatively accurate (within 23% for 
PM, and 8% for CM), Cumulative projected EVA crew times “grossly” exceed 
actions and the EVA numbers continue to diverge21. It seems possible that 
RMAT may have the same sensitivity to preventative maintenance scheduling as 
CMAM.   In order to test this theory, a comparative run was executed in RMAT 
for CMG failure rates both with and without preventative maintenance over the 
same period of time (26 years) and with the same Weibull shape parameter 
(β=5).  It was found that, although corrective maintenance actions increase when 
no PM was scheduled, the CM actions did not increase exponentially after the 
CMG wear-out period.22  The following table summarizes the results of the 
RMAT run on the CMG with and without preventative maintenance: 
                                            
21 LSAR (D684-10162-1-1, Revision O details this divergence issue and discusses possible 
causes on pages 4-1 and 4-2. 
22 The CMG wear-out period is defined as MTBMAtotal ≈ 6.5 years 
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CMG With and Without Preventative Maintenance-RMAT results






























Figure 12.   RMAT CMG Maintenance Action forecasts w/ and w/o PM 
When an RMAT run was executed on all of the 120 representative ORUS 
(the CMAM database) with and without PM schedules, it was found that RMAT 
corrective maintenance approximately doubles over a 26 year period while 
CMAM forecasted CM actions tend to increase exponentially for the same set of 
ORUs.  Thus it can be said that, while RMAT is not nearly as sensitive to lack of 
preventative maintenance on short MTBF ORUs as CMAM, it does tend to 
increase maintenance action requirements, and may be a contributing factor to 
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the overall trend of forecast versus actual failure divergence, especially in 
reference to external ORUs.        
An analysis of the RMAT ORU database (MADS) shows that of the 1379 
distinct ORUs within the database 729 are Interior (IVA) ORUs and 650 are 
Exterior (EVA) ORUs.  Of the 729 IVA ORUs, 32 have an associated Mean Time 
Between Preventative Maintenance Remove and Replace (MTBPMRR) , while of 
the 650 EVA ORUs, only 9 have an associated MTBPMRR.  Even more 
significant is that although exterior components on average have longer lives 
(longer MTBF/MTBMAtotals), there are still 71 EVA ORUs that have an MTBF 
less than 100000 hours and only 2 of these ORUs have an associated 
MTBPMRR (while of the 116 IVA ORUs with an MTBF less than 100000 hours, 
18 have preventative maintenance schedules).  This fact by itself may be enough 
to explain the divergence issue with respect to external ORUs while internal 
forecasts remain fairly accurate.   
Lastly, it must be stated that the simple addition of EVA preventative 
maintenance on short MTBF items does not seem to be the appropriate solution 
to the problem of exaggerated forecasted EVA failure rates for two reasons:   
• Historical/actual EVA maintenance actions (CM) do not seem to 
merit the addition of such maintenance (LSAR revision O shows 
only 5 EVA CM actions to date) 
• Additional preventative maintenance on EVA components is 
avoided (if possible) because it is inherently dangerous and time 
consuming 
Thus, it seems more likely that the use of a lower β value for determining wear- 
out failures should be explored, especially in reference to short MTBF external 
components.   It seems highly likely that β values closer to 1 (constant rate 
failures) would be more accurate to use based upon the historical/actual failure 
rates that are collected as the ISS matures.    
B.       CMAM UNCERTAINTY USING CRYSTAL BALL 
So far our discussion and analysis of failure rates for ORUs has centered 
on the distribution of time between failures (failure rate modes – constant rate 
and wear-out), as opposed to the accuracy of stated MTBFs and associated 
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MTBMAtotals.  Due to the unique nature of the ISS, and the unique components 
of its associated systems, reliability analysis of the ISS as a system and its ORUs 
individually is based upon predicted MTBF and K factor23 data.  This ensures 
that there will be added levels of uncertainly in ORU failure rates forecasts.  The 
idea is to quantify this uncertainly to the highest degree possible to aid in logistics 
and maintenance action planning.   
1. Purpose of Crystal Ball Simulation Package 
 The two major sources of uncertainly for failure rate calculations relate to 
inaccuracies of: 
• Mean Time Between Failures:  The Average time between failures 
of a specific ORU based upon characteristics of the ORU itself 
• K-Factor:  A multiplier that accounts for increased equipment 
maintenance actions not included in the inherent MTBF estimates.  
These maintenance actions include: human-induced, environmental 
induced, false maintenance, other equipment induced. 
For the purpose of CMAM uncertainty analysis, these two input 
parameters were treated as variables in developing failure rate estimates.  This 
was accomplished through the use of the Crystal Ball ® 2000 program. 
 Crystal Ball 2000 ® is a simulation program that assists in analyzing the 
risks and uncertainties associated with forecasting models.  Crystal Ball was 
chosen for this uncertainly analysis for the following reasons: 
• It allows the incorporation of all assumptions made for CMAM 
failure rate calculation purposes 
• It allows for multiple replications as needed to avoid randomness  
• It provides a confidence level for data sensitivity analysis. 
• It provides a means of analyzing data by utilizing dissimilar 
distributions exclusive of the probability distributions functions.24 
   
2. Assumptions 
 In order to simplify this uncertainty analysis a number of assumptions 
needed to be made: 
                                            
23 MTBF and K-factor (see Section III.C.1 for definition) are considered to be the two primary 
causes of uncertainty in failure rate calculation.  These factors are taken into account within 
RMAT (RMAT uses Monte-Carlo simulation with 600 iterations to account for these uncertainty 
factors). 
24 http://www.crystalball.com/crystal_ball/index.html, May 15, 2003 
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• Only constant failure rate Corrective Maintenance action 
requirements were looked at for all 120 ORUs within the CMAM 
database. 
• All 120 ORUs are assumed to be operational on the ISS (steady 
state calculation) 
• Both the MTBF and K-factor for each ORU have a normal 
distribution about the stated value and both have a standard 
deviation about this mean of 10%. 
• 600 iterations were performed for each ORU (in order to avoid 
randomness) 
• All ORUs are considered independent of one another, and equally 
mission critical. 
 
3. Crystal Ball Results 
Based upon constant failure rate calculation within CMAM a total of 6.38 
CM maintenance actions per year can be expected on these 120 ORUs.  The 
following figure shows the CMAM output screen for steady state calculations: 
 
Figure 13.   CMAM Steady State Output Results 
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When MTBF and K-factors were assumed to vary (normally 
disturbed w/ standard deviation of .1)  the following results were attained: 
Frequency Chart











6.00 6.23 6.45 6.68 6.90
600 Trials    3 Outliers
Forecast: Total CM Actions Required Top 120




















6.00 6.23 6.45 6.68 6.90
600 Trials    3 Outliers
Forecast: Total CM Actions Required Top 120
 
Figure 14.   Crystal Ball ®_ Output results 
Thus based upon these simulation input parameters the steady 
state CM failure rate forecasts can be expected (with 100% certainty) to 
fluctuate by no more than 15.88% of the mean value (range width of 1.02 
with a mean of 6.42).  With these figures it can be said that most errors in 
MTBF and K-factors alone cannot explain the divergence issues in relation 
to EVA forecasted versus actual maintenance requirements but more 
likely is a combination of MTBF & K-Factor uncertainty and inappropriate β 

















IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATION FOR CMAM USE 
The Comparative Maintenance Analysis Tool (CMAM) is a user-friendly 
alternative to RMAT for executing basic failure rate analysis on Orbital 
replacement units for the ISS.  It can provide immediate feedback for logistics 
planners on estimates of both corrective and preventative maintenance 
requirements for both internal and external ORUs.  CMAM is not meant as a 
replacement to the robust capabilities of RMAT, nor has the program been 
independently validated to ensure that its results are completely accurate.  
However, when validated it will provide a readily available tool for RMAT 
comparison that allows for clarification/simplification of the algorithms through 
which failure rate calculations are made.  Therefore, it is recommended that 
NASA L&M and Boeing L&M consider validating CMAM for use as a reference 
tool when forecasts from RMAT are either not needed, or when only basic failure 
rate data is required for planning purposes.      
Following this recommendation, the CMAM ORU database should be 
completed and updated in order to keep CMAM output results as accurate and 
complete as possible, and to allow for a more meaningful comparison with RMAT 
results.  Completion of this database is estimated to take between 35 and 45 
hours of work executed from the CMAM database input mask within the CMAM 
program.  Completion and usage of an Access-based database as opposed to 
the current Excel-based MADS listing will reduce the overall number of input 
errors into the ORU database and will most likely reduce the amount of time 
required to both maintain the database, and the amount of time required to 
format both CMAM and RMAT input files (through the cut and paste of Access 






B. RECOMMENDATION FOR FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
Based upon the results of the direct comparison between RMAT and 
CMAM it is recommended that the effects of reduced β values in reference to 
Weibull wear-out failures rates, as well as the effects of increased EVA 
MTBPMRR be explored in RMAT to determine the overall effects on failure rate 
forecasts, especially in reference to short MTBF external ORUs.   
Lastly, it is recommended that further research be conducted to find out if 
a program such as CMAM can be applied to such areas as forecasting failures of 
submarine components to optimize sparing and/or maintenance scheduling.  This 
research could take significant time in terms of populating new spare part 
databases with the appropriate reliability data but could provide a better 
forecasting tool than what is currently in use.      
C. CONCLUSION 
The International Space Station has a unique Logistics and Maintenance 
system that requires the efficient and effective forecasting of part failures and 
associated resource requirements.   Due to the complexity of the ISS as a 
system, and the environment in which it and its crew operates, forecasting these 
failures is often as much an art as it is a science.  Although the primary tool for 
executing ORU failure rate forecasts (RMAT) is a powerful analytical and 
simulation based program, it, just like any other probability forecasting tool, has 
its own set of inefficiencies, inaccuracies and weaknesses.   It is of primary 
importance to identify these weaknesses and their causes as quickly as possible.  
The growing divergence issue between external ORU forecasted failures and 
actual failures is an issue that deserves attention and correction.  This thesis is 
an attempt to analyze this issue and its underlying causes.  It is believed that, 
after studying the underlying failure rate calculation algorithms of RMAT and 
developing an independent program that replicates some of these calculations 
(CMAM), the underlying problem is a combination of multiple factors.  The 
primary factors are: 
• RMAT and CMAM are utilizing Weibull shape parameter (β) values 
that are too high in relation to wear-out failure forecasting 
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• Inherent uncertainty in the accuracy of ORU MTBF and K-factor 
values that tends to lead to inaccurate failure forecasts rates, 
especially when looking at a relatively small set of ORUs (120 for 
this analysis) over a relatively short period of time (approximately 6 


















APPENDIX A.  CMAM DATABASE 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The CMAM ORU database serves as the source of all ORU reliability data 
ORU failure rate calculation.  It provides a way to duplicate the majority of the 
information within the NASA R&M Modeling Analysis Data Set (MADS).  
However, the CMAM ORU database is not as comprehensive as MADS.  For 
each ORU MADS contains 59 separate fields, where-as the CMAM ORU 
database has only 26 fields per ORU.  However, the CMAM database is a 
relationship database with 3 separate but dynamically linked tables that can be 
updated from the CMAM user interface.   
B.  ASSUMPTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 
Stakeholders 
 The stakeholders in the database are the primary NASA L&M planners, 
NASA R&M personnel, and Boeing L&M personnel.   
Query Requirements 
 The primary query requirements focus on breaking down ORU failure rate 
forecasts by ISS assembly flight, and by ISS operational year.  However, NASA 
L&M staff often has analysis requirements that require database drill down 
capability down to the individual ORU level.  Therefore the following ORU query 
types have been preprogrammed into CMAM: 
• Search by Assembly Flight 
• Search by ISS Operational Year 
• Search by ISS system 
• Search by ORU Name 
• Search by Internal/External Component 
 Further database querying is accomplished through SQL formatting in 
Microsoft Access ® and then inputted into the CMAM program.     
C.  RELATIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND CONSTRAINTS 
 The CMAM ORU database design was executed through a series of 
iterative improvements to increase functionality/updatability through the CMAM 
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user interface.  To reduce implementation problems three database design tools 
were developed:   
• Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD) 
• Table/Column Diagram 
• Microsoft Access Relationship diagram 
Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD) 
 The ERD is a graphical schematic used to represent database entities and 
their relationships.  Entities are shown in rectangles while relationships are 
shown in diamonds.  Cardinalities between entities are within the diamonds.  
Each entity has a number of attributes that describe it (i.e. the entity Flight has 
the attributes of: Flight_Num and Flight_Date).  Lastly, relationships bridge the 
gap between entities. Each relationship has within it a minimum and a maximum 
cardinality, which, in a binary relationship, identifies the number of elements 
allowed on each side of the relationship.  CMAM has three such relationships 
that enhance the level of granularity of a users database search.  See Figure 15. 
Table/Column Diagram 
 The table/column diagram was then constructed to ensure that the 
corresponding tables and columns relevant to our ERD were ready for entry into 
Microsoft Access ® database design.  Primary keys for each table were 
identified, along with ensuring functional dependency of each non-primary 
attribute  (The tables were normalized).  See Figure 16. 
Microsoft Access Relationships 
 Lastly, the table/column diagram was translated into the Access® design 
view and the relationships were linked.  One of the key aspects of the CMAM 
ORU database is that each table and each attribute has specific input 
requirements (i.e. a field that requires a number will not accept a letter, etc), and 
referential integrity exits between the tables (i.e. you cannot add an ORU on a 
flight that doesn’t exist).  These qualities ensure both data accuracy and integrity 
on a much higher level than spreadsheets databases  (MADS is an excel 












































Figure 16.   CMAM ORU Database Table/Column Diagram 
 
Figure 17.   CMAM ORU Microsoft Access Relationship 
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D.  USER INTERFACE 
The CMAM ORU database interface is through two separate forms that 
allow for the dynamic update of both the ORUlist table and the Flight table.  The 
flight table input mask offers the added functionality of allowing standard dates to 
be entered (MM/DD/YY) and automatically converting them to decimal dates. 
(See Figures 18 and 19). 
 
Figure 18.   CMAM ORULIST Table User Interface 
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Figure 19.   CMAM FLIGHT Table User Interface  
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APPENDIX B.  LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AC   Assembly Complete 
ACDC   Assembly Complete Duty Cycle 
CMAM  Comparative Maintenance Assessment Tool 
CMG   Control Moment Gyro 
CM   Corrective Maintenance 
C1   Criticality Code 1 
C&T   Command & Telemetry 
CSRR   Crew Size Removal and Replace 
DC   Duty Cycle 
DECR   Decrement 
ECSCM  External Crew Size Corrective Maintenance 
EICM   External/Internal Corrective Maintenance 
EMST   External Maintenance Solution Team 
ERD   Entity Relationship Diagram 
EVA   Extra-Vehicular Activity 
Flt_Qty  Flight Quantity 
Flight_No  Flight Number 
GAO   General Accounting Office 
GUI   Graphic User Interface 
GRND  Ground  
ICSCM  Internal Crew Size Corrective Maintenance 
ISS   International Space Station 
ITCS   Internal Thermal Control System 
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IVA   Intra-Vehicular Activity 
IVR   Intra-Vehicular Robotics  
JSC   Johnson Space Center 
KSC   Kennedy Space Center 
LIFLIM  Life Limit 
Lchar   Life Characteristic 
L&M   Logistics and Maintenance 
LSAR   Logistics Supportability Assessment Report 
MADS   Modeling Analysis Data Set 
MTBF   Mean Time Between Failures 
MTBMAtotal  Mean Time Between Maintenance Actions total 
MTBPMRR Mean Time Between Preventative Maintenance Remove and 
Replace 
MTTF   Mean Time To Fail 
MTTR   Mean Time To Repair 
NASA   National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
OEM   Original Equipment Manufacturer 
OP   Operating ratio 
ORU   Orbital Replacement Unit 
PM   Preventative Maintenance 
PMRR  Preventative Maintenance Remove and Replace 
RMAT   Reliability and Maintainability Assessment Tool 
R&M   Reliability and Maintenance  
ROBMTTR  Robotic Mean Time To Repair 
51 
SQL   Structured Query Language 
START  Station Availability Reporting Tool 
THC   Temperature and Humidity Control 
USA   United Space Alliance 
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